I42AWEDSps UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 15-cr-616 (KBF) V. 5 DARCY WEDD, 6 Defendant. -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. April 2, 2018 9 1:05 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. KATHERINE B. FORREST 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 GEOFFREY S. BERMAN Interim United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York BY: SARAH E. PAUL, ESQ. 17 RICHARD A. COOPER, ESQ. JENNIFER BEIDEL, ESQ. Assistant United States Attorneys 18 19 SERCARZ & RIOPELLE, L.L.P. Attorneys for Defendant 20 BY: MAURICE H. SERCARZ, ESQ. ROBERT CALIENDO, ESQ. 21 -and-MARC FERNICH, ESQ. 22 Attorney for Defendant 23 24 25

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1 (In open court)

THE CLERK: In the matter United States of America v. Darcy Wedd, 15-cr-616.

Counsel, please state your names for the record.

MS. PAUL: Good afternoon, your Honor. Sarah Paul, Rich Cooper, and Jennifer Beidel for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, folks.

MR. SERCARZ: For the defendant Wedd, Maurice Sercarz, Robert Caliendo, and, your Honor, Marc Fernich is in the courtroom. He will be representing Mr. Wedd in any postsentencing matters. Is it all right if he comes up to the front table and joins us?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. FERNICH: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Of course.

All right. The Court notes that Mr. Wedd is here and present. Good afternoon.

All right, folks. You can all be seated.

The Court also notes that there are several dozen people here in the audience, and I assume that a number of them are here for Mr. Wedd, and while I recognize some folks from the U.S. Attorney's Office, I think the majority of people are here for Mr. Wedd.

So let's go ahead and get ourselves started. I typically start the sentencing proceedings by stating for the

record the counts of conviction and then also the materials that I have received as part of this proceeding, to make sure that we have a common universe. And then after that we'll go on to the PSR, then to the guidelines, and after that we'll have statements from counsel and then from Mr. Wedd if he would like to address the Court.

So the counts of conviction fall under really two buckets of counts. There's Counts One through Four, which relate to the Tatto scheme, and then five through eight relate to Zhenya. The first count is a conviction of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The second is wire fraud. The third is aggravated identity theft. The fourth is conspiracy to commit money laundering. That's all with respect to the Tatto scheme. Then for the Zhenya scheme there is conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. So those are the counts of conviction.

I have received several submissions from the defense: a sentencing submission dated March 19, 2018, attached to which are a number of letters. I have received a total, between that submission, a submission on March 29th, a submission today, and then two letters that came in on their own, a total of 57 months for Mr. Wedd. And I've also received, as an attachment to the March 19th submission from the defense, a submission from a sentencing specialist.

I've also received a sentencing submission from the government dated March 26, 2018 and a copy of a revised presentence investigation report dated March 9, 2018.

So those are the materials that I have received. Are there things that you folks think I should have that I have not mentioned? I should also say, just so that it's clear, I of course presided over the trial, as you folks know, over three trials, and so I'm very familiar with the trial record in this matter. But I'm taking that as an assumed body of material.

Anything from the government that I should have that I haven't mentioned?

MR. COOPER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sercarz.

MR. SERCARZ: No, your Honor. You covered it. I thought I noticed a quizzical look from my friend, Mr. Cooper. The letter from the sentencing specialist was also an exhibit to our thick submission.

THE COURT: Yes. It's Exhibit G as in George. It's Joel Sickler. And I just separate it because there are letters otherwise that are broken into a number of categories, and then there's that piece.

All right. The PSR, let's go on to, then, the PSR.

Mr. Sercarz, have you had an opportunity to review the PSR with
your client?

MR. SERCARZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I note that there were a number of modifications to the PSR that appear to have occurred during the back-and-forth of the drafting process, but are there any additional modifications that you believe should be made to the PSR, or objections that you have to the factual statements in the PSR?

MR. SERCARZ: None beyond what is contained in my submission, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As I understand your submission in terms of the issues that are raised, they're largely with regard to the guidelines calculation, which I do not adopt as a matter of course. I would only adopt the factual statements in the PSR. Are there any factual errors that you believe have been unaddressed in the PSR?

MR. SERCARZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Wedd, it is my practice always to ask the defendant himself if you know of any factual errors in the PSR.

THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Sercarz, you have reviewed the PSR with your client?

MR. SERCARZ: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Does the government have any factual modification to or objections to the PSR?

MR. COOPER: No, your Honor.

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THE COURT: The Court does adopt the factual statement in the PSR. The PSR will be made part of the record in this matter and filed under seal. If an appeal is taken, then counsel on any appeal may have access to the PSR without any need for further application to the Court.

Let's then go on to the next sort of series of points, which have to do with the guidelines calculation. As you folks know, the Court is required to correctly calculate the guidelines for every defendant, and that is true irrespective of whether the Court is going to follow the guidelines. guidelines are not to be taken as reasonable; they are to be a guide for the Court. Here, there are a number of arguments that have been presented, both by the defense against what probation has calculated as the guidelines and by the government in response to the defense arguments. So what I would like to do right now is to go through the guidelines, to tell you how I propose that they be calculated, without reaching a final resolution on that calculation until I've given you folks an opportunity to address the Court again. Ι don't need you to restate a point that you've made in your submission, though if you want to -- for the guidelines, although if you want to reiterate them, I'm not going to stop anyone. But I want to make sure that you understand I'm not thinking anybody has waived their arguments on the guidelines by not reiterating them right now.

So, as you folks know, because there are multiple counts of conviction, the Court does undertake a grouping analysis, and that ultimately leads us to 2B1.1(a)(1). We are at, with an offense level of 7 -- I don't think there's any dispute about that because the counts of conviction that lead us to 2B1.1 are counts which carry a 20-year maximum sentence. So that leads us to an offense level, base offense level, of 7.

The first set of issues that are disputed between the parties here have to do with the loss amount. As you folks know and briefed, under the guidelines, the loss amount can be based upon a couple of things. One is actual loss — I should say reasonably foreseeable actual loss. The other is intended loss. So I've reviewed the guidelines. I'm not going to recite all of the guidelines language right now. But I've reviewed the guidelines and the application notes. I've also reviewed the parties' arguments on the guidelines.

It does appear to me that the loss amount of greater than 65 million but under 150 million, that that range does not include the content providers. Now, let me tell you how I arrive at that. It is based both upon testimony, but, importantly, it's based upon the extrapolation of what Zhenya would have received or what Miao would have received, what the amount of the schemes would have been when you look only at the percentage of the amount that was received by the defendant and his co-conspirators. In other words, when you look at GX 1401,

that gives you, I think, a misleading view. First of all, GX 1401 includes both content provider money, which is not includable, and everyone agrees is not includable and should not be included, but also, it only includes those amounts paid to the co-conspirators, who were working for Mobile Messenger. It doesn't include all of the amounts that were being paid to others. And so you have to sort of extrapolate up, if you will, from that document. So that document only gives us a piece of the picture, and you need to go to other sources.

The other sources for that are the testimony of Miao, the testimony of Pajaczkowski, and the overall testimony relating to the Zhenya scheme and to the Miao scheme. The Miao scheme had an overall amount of \$112 million. And the Tatto scheme the Zhenya scheme had an overall loss amount of \$41 million. So it's \$153 million all together. That's based upon the gross amount that was attributable to those.

The first point I want to make is, I believe that the \$153 million is well grounded and supportable as noncontent provider receipts. I want to ask the defense, who had asserted in their papers that it included content providers, whether or not — and you're not waiving your other arguments as to how it may overstate Mr. Wedd's culpability or anything else, but just in terms of the amounts attributable to the two schemes, whether or not you've got a basis to say that it really only can relate to the content provider schemes, because the way I

look at it, I don't think it does.

Mr. Sercarz.

MR. SERCARZ: Your Honor, I think you're right to the degree that you can get above \$65 million without including any of the content provider money. I don't intend to belabor the issues very much at all beyond the lengthy submission that I made dealing with these subjects, but I want to point out two things. Leave aside the content provider money. With regard to the Tatto scheme, I think the Court still has a decision to make about whether or not to include within the scope of the conspiracy money that Tatto made auto-subscribing on the aggregation platforms of aggregators other than Mobile

Messenger, because I think that accounts for a lot of the money in Government's Exhibit 1401. It accounts for the wide range that the government has provided.

With regard to the Tatto scheme, there was also an issue as to whether or not it was reasonably foreseeable to my client and a part of the conspiracy that Tatto, or Mr. Miao in particular, would take it upon himself to auto-subscribe all of the phone numbers that he was given. I dealt with this in my submission, but the Court is aware of Mr. Miao's version of the conversation that took place in San Diego and Mr. Pajaczkowski's playbook and the instructions that called upon Mr. Miao to auto-subscribe only one third or thereabouts, 30 percent to be more precise, of the customers whose phone

numbers he had been given for that purpose.

With regard to the Zhenya conspiracy, I think there is an open question, even if you adopt the government's version of what took place and the money paid to the four Mobile Messenger executives was the proceeds of auto-subscribing to be split among the four executives rather than revenue sharing in exchange for the preprovision short codes, even if you accept that, it's still an open question, I respectfully submit, whether all of the money that Zhenya paid to MBKSE Ventures, which is the beginning of the long, circuitous trail by which money reached the four Mobile Messenger executives, as to whether all of that money was indeed the proceeds of auto-subscribing.

And I say that because if it's 65 million or less, you come down two points. And I say it while I'm on my feet, fully mindful that I am hoping at the end of this proceeding to receive some solace from *United States v. Crosby*, which says in effect that if a defendant can be found at one of two adjacent guidelines calculations and the court sees fit at the end of the day to impose a nonguidelines sentence, that the court does not, if I understand the case correctly, even have to make a choice.

THE COURT: Well, let's just cut to the chase in one respect, which is that the guidelines calculated in a variety of different ways would lead to an offense level of 43. I

think that there is no debate that Mr. Wedd is in a criminal history category of I. Therefore his guidelines are light.

There's not a chance that I would impose a life sentence. That is not on the table. And so we are talking about a nonguidelines sentence right out of the box.

And so I think people -- I do not see the government asking for a guideline sentence and I would not impose a guideline sentence in this case.

So we are talking about a variance. We'll deal with a departure request in a moment, but let's just get that off the table. All right.

So let's just go to the issues that Mr. Sercarz has raised. I can deal, I think, pretty easily with the Miao and the Digi-CF pieces. But I'm going to ask the government to respond both to those, but also to the part of the conspiracy for \$112 million that deals with other aggregators, so I'll come back to that. But in terms of whether or not it was reasonably foreseeable that Miao would auto-subscribe all of the numbers, I believe it was reasonably foreseeable, for several different reasons: one, it doesn't appear that Mr. Wedd got himself into the weeds of exactly how Mr. Pajaczkowski would be in fact assisting Miao with auto-subscribing. There was a general sense that he would assist him in a manner that ought to lead to less risk of detection. But how exactly that would be done, whether that would result in a reduced

percentage or any particular percentage auto-subscribing is not something as to which there was testimony.

It was, however, on the other hand, quite well known that, by this point in time, when the Tatto scheme was agreed to, that Miao was a disreputable character, an individual who had engaged in auto-subscribing, and who didn't really seem to have any particular moral compass. So it was well and truly something that could have been reasonably predicted that Miao would, through a venal impulse, try to take as much as he could possibly take from any auto-subscribing opportunity made available to him. So I don't find persuasive and did not find persuasive in the submission the argument that the Miao scheme, the Tatto scheme, was anticipated to be only 30 percent of its denominator, versus a hundred percent, based upon a sense of trying to only auto-subscribe a portion of the phone numbers.

As to Zhenya, for that, the argument, as I understand it, is really that the Digi-CF, that it was not foreseeable, really, that they were going to be auto-subscribing and that there was not an auto-subscribing conspiracy, that they were somehow — there was a revenue share in place for the, as they've been described, pre-provisioned short codes. I actually don't think that that is supported, well supported by the evidence. I understand that it's the argument that the defense had made and made it to the jury that Digi and CF were really — that the moneys flowing in through those companies

could have been anticipated to simply be just short code revenue shares. I don't find that persuasive at all. I think that there was ample evidence that I found reliable and persuasive that Digi and CF were set up for the purpose of auto-subscribing, that they were known to be directed towards that endeavor, and that in fact they did auto-subscribe, and that the moneys were understood to be the proceeds of auto-subscribing. So for that argument I also put that to the side.

I would, however, like to hear whatever additional points the government would like to make on either of those, as well as the argument that some portion of the \$112 million relates to proceeds from Mr. Miao, or Tatto, for other aggregators, and whether or not other aggregation proceeds was related conduct and/or reasonably foreseeable.

Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: Yes, your Honor. So I'll start there. First, the number does include proceeds that Miao obtained from auto-subscribing on other mobile aggregators. It's the upper left-hand corner of Government Exhibit 1401, MBlox and OpenMarket in addition to Mobile Messenger.

There are three reasons why the inclusion of that is appropriate here. First, from a reasonable-foreseeability standpoint, at the time that Mr. Wedd joined the conspiracy in October 2011, Mr. Wedd knew that Miao had been auto-subscribing

on other mobile aggregators in addition to Mobile Messenger.

There was that string of e-mails, the Court may recall,

Government Exhibits 185, 186, and 187, at the last trial, where

Mobile Messenger employees were discussing having been

auto-subscribed -- I believe this is in the August, September

2011 time frame -- having been auto-subscribed by Miao-owned

companies on other mobile aggregators.

There is also sufficient evidence to find by a preponderance that Mr. Wedd himself had been auto-subscribed on a Miao short code on a different mobile aggregator.

So from the perspective of, at the time Mr. Wedd joined the conspiracy, whether he had a basis to understand that Miao was already doing similar things with other mobile aggregators, there certainly was. And the Court sees that sort of thing all the time. The most common example, in my mind, is a narcotics conspiracy, where if a member joins knowing that co-conspirators have already been selling on other blocks in other areas and has a good sense for the scope of that, they are responsible for what happened before. But the case here is much stronger than that, because the loss amounts attributable to Mr. Miao auto-subscribing on other aggregators are from time periods after Mr. Wedd joined. So if there's a question as to whether it was foreseeable to him that Miao was doing this and others, it certainly was.

THE COURT: Isn't there an argument, though, just sort

of an easier road, which is, you can take those amounts out and still be above the threshold for the 2B1.1(b)(1)(M) guideline provision which provides for the increase of over 65 million.

MR. COOPER: Yes. Those would be the third point.

But even subtracting out those others, the CF and Digi consumer loss, plus the Mobile Messenger-related Miao consumer loss gets you over the 65 million.

The other point to make on this particular issue is that Mr. Wedd got paid a percentage of all Miao auto-subscribing regardless of whether it occurred on Mobile Messenger, MBlox, or OpenMarket. Mr. Pajaczkowski testified to that, and that's the transcript at page 265.

So in terms of his involvement being auto-subscribing on the other aggregators, it was well proven at trial.

The only other point on this topic, in addition to the fundamental point that, even subtracting out OpenMarket and MBlox, you still get above the guidelines hump of \$65 million dollars, is that in October 2011 when Miao met with Mr. Wedd, Miao disclosed to Mr. Wedd that he had been doing this, in other words, he had been auto-subscribing on MBlox.

THE COURT: I am persuaded that the record supports by a preponderance of the evidence a loss amount that is greater than \$65 million but less than \$150 million. Where it falls within that range I need not determine, because I find that it reaches the point where it triggers the 24-level enhancement --

or increase in the offense level, I should say, not enhancement — but does not go over the \$150 million, by a preponderance of the evidence. And I base that upon the Court's view that, first of all, it's not necessary that I include the OpenMarket or MBlox amount in order to even get there. But second of all, even if I did, for essentially the reasons that Mr. Cooper has stated, it's supported by the record. So I will find by a preponderance of the evidence that loss amount.

I should also note a few additional points about the factual underpinnings for this, which is that I do believe that the record supports -- I should say all my findings today that are factual in nature are based upon a preponderance of the evidence -- that Mr. Wedd understood what the auto-subscribing business -- the kind of breadth that Miao was capable of and Zhenya was capable of given the breadth of the business that Mobile Messenger was in -- in other words, there were just millions of phone numbers that could be used -- and therefore that there was a reasonably foreseeable huge scope for this.

I also believe that it's well supported by the record that Mr. Wedd understood exactly what Paj could do for Miao and how Paj and others could assist Zhenya both in setting up a scheme and then proceeding with it, and that the numbers — also that Mr. Wedd was aware of the amount of money that was coming in at various points in time to his companies, and it

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was reasonably easy to extrapolate from that an increase in the overall amount or what the overall amount would have been that would have been given to the other co-conspirators, including the large amounts given to Zhenya and to Miao.

One point that I want to address very specifically is whether or not there should be any reduction or alteration in the loss amount due to amounts returned to consumers. That was a point that was alluded to in the defense submission. not find that there is any basis for such reductions. basis for such reduction that was alluded to was some sort of almost like an offsetting principle. But it is quite clear from the way in which a loss amount is calculated that reductions are only available when it's by the defendant or others jointly working with him before the fraud is detected, and that the point of the deductions, or reduction, is really if somebody has learned that -- or comes to view their behavior as wrongful and is able to start making it right at a point prior to when law enforcement or somebody else decides that they've been caught, that there is some benefit that should be given for that.

Here, however, there is no evidence that the -- in any significant way, that the co-conspirators, or in particular Mr. Wedd, themselves are responsible for the amounts returned to consumers. That has been done by another victim and series of victims here of the fraud, which were some of the telephone

companies, have actually refunded some of the money. That is not the kind of reduction or offset that was anticipated by the guidelines. And so I don't find that it's applicable here. Therefore the loss amount I do find is at the range as I've described it, which has a base, so we now would increase the offense level by 24 levels. So it's 7 at the base, plus 24.

Let's go on to the next piece, which is the ten or more victims. I didn't see any argument from the defense that that is not applicable. I think it's reasonably applicable based upon paragraph 79 of the PSR, along with testimony and exhibits that indicate that there were thousands of individuals who were victims. So that would add two additional offense levels.

Is there any additional argument anybody wants to make about that?

MR. SERCARZ: No.

THE COURT: OK. Then sophisticated means. That's under 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). Again, I think there really is not an argument that's been made here that does not apply. The use of shell companies and the layers of shell companies is certainly in and of itself sufficient to support that determination.

Also the process, for which there is a great deal of evidence, of spoofing the double opt-in, the entire technological process that was put in place here is sufficient to support the inclusion of the sophisticated means enhancement. And so I

would refer to paragraphs 39 to 41 of the PSR, 43, and 44, 49, 51 to 53, and 56 to 59, and also to application note 2B1.1, application note 9. And so I think that there's ample basis to include sophisticated means.

Is there any additional argument anybody would like to make about that?

Hearing nothing, let's go on to the next one, which is that the defendant was convicted back under Section 1956. That is under 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), the basis for an inclusion of two additional levels. Any argument about that?

MR. SERCARZ: No.

THE COURT: OK. The next one, which is contested, is for the role adjustment. And that's under 3B1.1(a). The question is whether or not Wedd was an organizer or leader of a scheme that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive under the meaning of the guidelines. Here, there's been briefing by both sides on that point. And I do find that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that Mr. Wedd was an organizer or leader that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The basis for that is that, while Miao and even Zhenya were also undoubtedly leaders — for Miao, for instance — we'll take each of those schemes separately. For Miao, he was a leader of the scheme in one sense, but also there was another leader for the aggregation side. It was the individual who gave the authorization for the scheme to occur

on the Mobile Messenger platform, and then essentially organized and gave authorization to individuals under him to proceed with executing on that scheme. And that was Pajaczkowski. And Pajaczkowski testified persuasively to the Court that Mr. Wedd really was the one who introduced Mr. Pajaczkowski to this opportunity — it didn't happen the other way around — and that Mr. Wedd was in fact necessary for Mr. Pajaczkowski to have gotten involved here.

For Zhenya, the scale of the Zhenya, Digi, and CF schemes was such that, without Mr. Wedd's involvement, it is exceedingly unlikely that they could have occurred, and indeed there is no evidence that they would have occurred in the absence of his involvement. While there was the Assifuah scheme and so there is some demonstration that auto-subscribing was able to occur without Mr. Wedd, that scheme, as we know, failed quite quickly and without having really taken root. CF and Digi we know were being monitored as among the largest clients of Mobile Messenger. They very quickly became the largest clients. And there is no indication that their business was other than auto-subscribing.

So I do find that there is a sufficient factual basis.

In addition, in terms of extensiveness, I should say, there were millions of -- well, thousands of consumers, millions of dollars that were obtained from the scheme. The scheme was nationwide. And, again, it required layers of

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So I believe that the role adjustment is appropriately includable for those factual reasons. Apart from what you folks have already argued in your papers, is there anything else you would like to add?

MR. SERCARZ: Only this, your Honor, since we're still on the subject of the guidelines -- and I do it at the risk of further damaging my credibility -- my client was the chief operating officer of Mobile Messenger. In that position, there is no question but that he would have had to sign new contracts. He would have been in effect the gatekeeper. quoted from the record as to those efforts by Mr. Pajaczkowski and Mr. Eromo to describe my client's role in the offense, and I would respectfully submit that they groped for terminology that would be useful and terminology beyond that according simply to someone who was in the position of authority over the company. I don't believe the guidelines were structured in such a way that it is automatically, when it comes to these calculations, that the person who has the most authority in the company is by that definition in a leadership role with regard to unlawful conduct that is taking place at the company.

I acknowledge -- and I'm going to talk about this a little bit later -- that the defendant can be punished and perhaps should be punished, given his role, given his authority over the company as a whole, but since we're still discussing

the guidelines, for whatever this is worth to the Court, your Honor, I respectfully submit that the fact that my client was the chief operating officer of the company does not make him ipso facto the chief operating officer of the fraud at the aggregator.

THE COURT: All right. So let me just take that head on, which is, I do not base the Court's finding on a mere position. As I've described — and we can rely only on the Miao-Tatto situation for this point — it's quite clear to the Court — and I do credit that Mr. Miao asked Mr. Wedd whether he could auto-subscribe, and Mr. Wedd, in the Court's view, agreed, that he could and that he would assist in that process, and went back to his company to provide the structure for that to be able to occur and to facilitate it. So it's not the position of authority as chief operating officer, it is his direct and active involvement at the highest level that the Court based its finding on.

But let me also make another point so that you understand where my head is during this proceeding, because I think it's a relevant point to the overall situation. I don't find that Mr. Wedd was conscious — that the basis for knowledge was conscious avoidance. It is my view that he understood and knew and participated directly and actually and fully, and was all in on the auto-subscribing. It was not happening without his awareness, without his involvement. I

don't think at this point in time that there is any real, in my view, serious basis to believe otherwise. So that is therefore inconsistent with the view that simply his position as COO is the basis for my findings.

I think we've all made our record on this. And so I will add the four levels for the role adjustment.

We get to obstruction of justice. I think my comments that I just made just now on my view as to Mr. Wedd's position indicate that I am not of the view that conscious avoidance is the basis for a finding of knowledge. But let me just also then go on to why I think that there is a basis for the next enhancement, which is obstruction of justice.

Obstruction of justice. I think that we -- I don't know that anyone disagrees that, under Section 3C1.1, perjury is a basis, under Application Note 4(B), for the inclusion of an obstruction of justice enhancement. I do believe that there is an ample basis in the record to find that Mr. Wedd was knowledgeable about auto-subscribing directly and clearly. He was not under any mistaken impression about this. There were meetings in which he participated where this was discussed, where the nuts and bolts of it were agreed to, where he himself agreed with Miao. It's too consistent, too persuasive, for any other determination.

Based upon that, the testimony that you folks, the defense cited was testimony where it was amenable to an "even

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if" argument, which is, even if you accepted that testimony, there was still a consistent way of finding lack of perjury.

That let's put to the side. Let me just read into the record several portions of the trial testimony that are the basis for the Court's finding of perjury.

Transcript page 1487 and 1488:

- "Q. Mr. Wedd," he was asked on direct, "did you knowingly and intentionally participate in a conspiracy to defraud consumers through auto-subscribing?
- 10 | "A. No, I didn't."
- 11 That's perjury.

auto-subscribing?

- "Q. Did you knowingly and intentionally engage in financial transactions designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of
- 16 | "A. No, I did not.
- "Q. Did you knowingly use telephone numbers of the autosubscribers to auto-subscribe these customers?
- 19 "A. No, I didn't.
- 20 | Page 1548, line 22:
- 21 "Q. Mr. Wedd, did you ever authorize Mr. Pajaczkowski to 22 provide" --
- sorry. Let me skip that one altogether because I'm trying to focus on the other one.
- 25 1614.

- "Q. Did you ever agree to allow Tatto to auto-subscribe on
 Mobile Messenger's platform?
- 3 "A. No, I didn't.
- "Q. Did you knowingly receive proceeds from auto-subscription
 that took place by Tatto?
- 6 "A. No."

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- "Q. Did you know that either one of those companies," which were CF and Digi in the prior Q and A, "was using their short codes to engage in auto-subscribing in your aggregation platform?
- 12 | "A. No, I didn't."
- 13 Page 1651:
- "Q. Did you become aware of that money you were receiving from

 Zhenya as part of this revenue share was the proceeds in

 auto-subscribing activity?
- 17 | "A. No, I didn't."
- 18 | 1656:
- "Q. Did you ever agree with anyone to engage in
 auto-subscribing activity?
- 21 | "A. No, I didn't.
- 22 | "Q. Did you engage in auto-subscribing activity?
- 23 "A. No, I didn't did.
- "Q. Did you ever use telephone numbers for the purpose of engaging in auto-subscribing activity?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you ever knowingly receive money that you knew was the proceeds of auto-subscribing activity?

"A. No, I didn't."

So the basis of the Court's finding that there was perjury is those Q and As. I would note that there were also similar Q and As at the prior two trials, at trial I, trial II. That perjury was designed to mislead the jury, to influence the jury into either a hung result or into a defense verdict, and therefore it was an attempt directly to change the prosecution in the defendant's favor. So I do find that the obstruction of justice is appropriately includable.

That then adds two additional levels.

Is there any additional argument, other than what you folks have already included in your papers, that you'd like to raise right now?

OK. So the next one is the abuse of position of trust or use of special skill. The government requests this enhancement. If you look at the application notes for this particular provision in the guidelines, that when you are using your position to transfer a means of identification, as used under 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7)(C) and (D), that that can be the basis for the abuse of position of trust, that provision, that statutory provision, refers to telecommunication, identifying information, and unique electronic identification numbers.

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Those are in turn properly considered to be the equivalent of cellphone numbers from consumers.

In addition, the Court finds that that provision refers to a position of private trust as well as public trust, so I'm focused here on private. It need not only be a fiduciary, in the way in which a fiduciary in a trust, for instance, is considered. It can be a position of trust. Here, as evidenced by the statutory reference to the means of identification, Congress had already previously linked position of trust to one, an individual who had access to means of identification and then misused that access in a manner to hurt That's what occurred here. And the Court finds consumers. that, in Mr. Wedd's position as COO, he set the direction and tone of the company and got his highest-level folks organized, among the highest-level folks organized to engage in this He had managerial discretion to do so, but more importantly than just having that discretion, he in fact utilized it for this. His position did contribute to the facilitation of the scheme, by allowing Tatto to move the codes over, by signing, as I've said, the CF and Digi contracts, but also, more importantly, by concealing proceeds through the multiple layers of companies, and also concealing and assisting in the concealment of the activity overall.

So the application of this enhancement is consistent with the statute, the congressional intent, and the case law in

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this area. So I do find that that is the -- the two levels are applicable. Anybody want to add anything to what they have already said?

The last arguments are relating to a request for a downward departure. I am not going to depart. I am going to vary downwards. But it won't be a departure. I have looked at the U.S. v. Algahaim case. There I would note, first of all, there was a base offense level of 6, not 7. It wasn't the highest. But there was argument that the exponential increase -- it was, I think, three times in that case -- of the base offense level by the loss amount was something that the court could take into consideration and, by virtue of the remand, should take into consideration, when determining reasonableness of overall sentence. That is certainly true. Ι am considering the loss amount in connection with Mr. Wedd's I've already indicated that my intention is to vary downwards, that while there is a very large amount of money at issue and it does increase Mr. Wedd's guidelines by a lot because of that, I am allowing for consideration of the extent to which Mr. Wedd's overall punishment should not be based purely on some sort of numerical algorithmic or other simple loss enhancement number.

I would also, however, note the argument that there were overlapping enhancements for the same conduct. That was another argument that was made. I don't find that that is in

fact the case here. Each of the particular provisions that we talked about that have led to enhancements are seeking to address separate behavior, in terms of, for instance, the number of victims, which is consumer oriented, the role adjustment, which has to do with the manner in which the defendant actually executed the scheme, the obstruction of justice, in terms of the jury particularly. The abuse of position is really about the ability to utilize a particular data set. So these are not the kind of multiple overlapping enhancements that one sees, for instance, in something like the child pornography cases, where it can really become more truly overlapping.

Then there is also an argument about disparities in other sentences between -- in a number of instances where fraud sentences are not guidelines sentences in this district as well as elsewhere. I am taking that into consideration in terms of a variance. And that is part of my determination as to why a variance here is appropriate.

I think based upon what I've said, we end up at an offense level 45, which then adjusts downwards to 43 because the maximum offense level under the guidelines is 43. Is there anything that -- that's where I'm ending up. Is there anything anybody would like to add?

All right. The Court does confirm the guideline as 43. What that means in terms of months is, if there are eight

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counts of conviction, six of which have 20-year mandatory -sorry, not mandatory -- 20-year maximum sentences, the maximum statutory penalty for six of the counts are 20 years, and so because it would otherwise be indicated as life, you take the 240 months of each of the separate counts of conviction, multiply it by 6. So it's 240 times 6, which equals 1440. That is the number of months attributable to the nonaggravated identity theft counts. Count Three and Count Seven are aggravated identity theft. They were separate and treated differently because they have two-year mandatory consecutive That is both the mandatory sentence and the maximum sentence. And so it's 24 months for each of Count Three and Count Seven. It's a total of 48 months. And so the way to get the number of months for the guidelines calculation is to take 240, multiply it times the six counts of conviction, come up with 1440, then 24 months times 2 for Counts Three and Seven. That's 48 months. That adds up to a total of 1488 months, is the guidelines range that is possible, given the statutory maximum sentences for this defendant.

Is there any additional point anybody would like to make?

MR. COOPER: No.

THE COURT: No. All right. Let's go on, then, to the next piece, which is to hear from you folks. And we've been going for almost an hour. We can do two things. One, we could

take a very short break now, or we could just go right into it and then finish. But I'm thinking that you folks may want to talk for a little while. And so maybe we should just take a very short, like three-minute break now, stretch our legs, and come back? All right. Let's do that. Let's take a very short break and come back. Thank you.

(Recess)

THE COURT: The way in which I typically proceed is, I have the government go first, the defense counsel go second, and then lastly give defendants the opportunity to have the a last word before sentence is imposed.

Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: Thank you, your Honor. At the outset, we just note that there's certainly, based on the letters and the presence in the courtroom, there's a lot of friends and family support from Mr. Wedd. And the letters that the defense has submitted do describe one side of the defendant that the Court certainly should take into account as a factor under 3553(a).

But it's clear to the government that the letter writers don't know the side of Mr. Wedd that was illuminated through the trials in this courtroom. And we want to discuss that side and a few of the sentencing factors that are applicable there, in particular, the seriousness of the offense, the defendant's role in the offense and lack of remorse, and the particular need here for general deterrence.

So I'd like to take each of those in turn. First, in terms of the seriousness of the offense, this, as we say in our submission, was a true Main Street crime. The victims here — and the PSR says thousands. We believe the number approaches the millions. The victims of this offense came from all walks of life. The only limiting factor here was people who had the misfortune to have their cellphone numbers in the Mobile Messenger database for one reason or another. That was the only limiting factor.

And so folks who were victims of this fraud ranged from the very wealthy to the people who could not afford on a monthly basis to have \$10 stolen from them. And the defendant here knew full well that, for many of the victims, that incremental ten dollars might mean the difference between having their cellphone operate the next month and having it shut down for lack of service.

At trial, the Court may recall, there was testimony from the defendant about his billability project at Mobile Messenger, which was an analysis to determine which telephone numbers would be able to be billed. The Court may remember there were some limitations like people who have prepaid cellphones, people whose cellphones may be shut down if a premium SMS charge were to be placed on that phone. So the defendant knew full well that sending out these charges to people who hadn't authorized, asked for, or accepted them

could, for many of those victims, be the difference between having their cellphone, which is a vital link to the world nowadays, between having that and not having that. And that is quite significant in the government's view.

In that regard, one aspect of the defense's written submission struck us as particularly problematic, and we address it in our submission, but I do want to amplify it today. There was a suggestion, in a few places in the submission, that somehow the defendant should be given somewhat of a benefit because the average loss amount to consumers was relatively low, \$10, \$20, maybe \$30. And that is a very dangerous assertion for a couple of reasons. First, people who have money stolen from them, \$10 at a time, are every bit as deserving of the protection of our laws as wealthy individuals who have millions of dollars stolen from them. There should not be a distinction, in terms of number of victims, based on that.

That type of thinking is essentially carrying forward the type of thinking that Mr. Wedd and his co-conspirators operated under at the time they committed the fraud, which is, if we do a little bit of fraud over a large number of people, the chances of success, the chances of getting away undetected, are going to be higher. And indeed, if you step back and think about it, it makes this type of fraud much harder to detect, because people who are penalized \$10 at a time might be less

inclined at the outset to even notice that they were the victims of a fraud, but even more, once they notice, there is a lot less incentive for them to go forward and report the fraud, to contact the police, to contact the FBI or the IRS, to even complain to the telephone company, because of the low value. There are many who may just have paid the amount without thinking about it, thinking it was an additional surcharge or tax that the telephone company put on their bill and that they had to pay it.

And so in terms of incentives to victims to report, it's just that much harder when you have a lot of victims who are stolen from a little bit at a time. So we believe there should be no benefit given to the defendant based on the average loss amount. If anything, it's more pernicious to have a fraud that steals a little bit at a time from a lot of people.

The second point we want to make is about the defendant's role in the offense and lack of remorse. The defendant's submission pits him in a certain sense as a pawn of Miao and of Zhenya and of others acting within Mobile Messenger in an unscrupulous fashion. I'm not going to belabor this point because the Court has already indicated that the Court does not view this as a crime of a conscious avoidance but rather as a willful and intentional crime. But the point I do want to make is that the defendant's role here was absolutely

essential. He was the but-for cause of millions and millions if not hundreds of millions of dollars of loss. And he has shown a complete lack of remorse, in his testimony at trial and in the sentencing submission where he essentially blames others and asserts that this was at most a case of negligent supervision rather than intentional and willful conduct.

His own letter doesn't address the offense. Now, that's his right and we understand he's preserving his appeal rights, but nothing in the letter puts in context, or seeks to explain the conduct at issue. Nothing makes it any bit less willful and intentional than it actually was.

And the last point we want to make is on general deterrence. There are really two separate points here. The first, which will I'll describe first, is a similar general deterrence point as the Court sees for any similarly situated white collar fraud defendant. The second one is particular to this offense. But first, this is a crime that appears to have been committed for two motives: first, for the defendant's personal financial benefit, and, second, for the financial benefit of the defendant's company, Mobile Messenger. On the first part, as the trial evidence showed, during the time the defendant engaged in this conduct, he lived a high-flying, lavish lifestyle. There was testimony in the exhibits about expensive cars, multimillion-dollar real estate, major investments in Hollywood productions. So in part he stole from

victims, from main Street victims, to fund his own lavish lifestyle.

The second part was to help his company. And to be clear, that's a new defense and the government does not believe that that in any way mitigates the extent of the harm of the conduct. The fact that some part of the motive was to help a corporation that he was wound up in rather than himself does not mitigate the harm here, because from the victims' perspective, it doesn't matter whether the money was stolen to go to some car or some apartment building or to go to help prop up Mobile Messenger's revenues to make their quarter numbers or their year-end numbers. The fact is that the money was stolen and Mr. Wedd was central to that.

The white collar fraud defendants like Mr. Wedd should factor in the fact that if they get caught, there will be a substantial term of imprisonment out there, when they decide whether or not to engage in fraud.

But the second element is particular to this crime.

And we discuss this a bit in our submission. Mr. Wedd was essentially synonymous with Mobile Messenger in the United States. As he testified to, he was the first employee in the U.S. He raised his hand. He came here, and he built a company in the United States. He rose to the seniormost position. And he used the company and its facilities to commit this fraud.

The compliance function at this company, at Mobile

Messenger, was corrupted by Mr. Wedd. Now, to be sure, others, including Mr. Pajaczkowski, bear their fair share of responsibility. But Mr. Wedd is the one who created this culture of individuals with respect to auto-subscribing using their positions to get money. He's the one who used Mobile Messenger's compliance function, that should have been looking out to detect crimes, to stop them, and to report them to law enforcement, he is the one who told Miao, go see Paj, go see the head of compliance, he's going to be able to help us keep this crime undetected so we can get more money.

And that is a particularly pernicious factor when you think about corporate crime, the fact that this sentencing is an opportunity to send a message that compliance functions at companies, like the one at Mobile Messenger, should not be corrupted, should not be perverted, to advance individuals' corrupt ends, but should be doing what it's supposed to be doing, which is to be a watchdog on the lookout.

Other than that, unless the Court has particular questions, we'll rest on our submission.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Sercarz.

MR. SERCARZ: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, there are three things that I'd like to do, and I'll try and do them quickly. I want to talk about the

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government's sentencing submission and the comments that were just made by Mr. Cooper. I want to talk about the concept of deterrence, which clearly is an important goal in any sentence and which it is clear will be an important goal in this one. And then finally, I want to talk about the defendant's character.

First of all, there's something that has to be stated and made very clear right at the outset. The government devoted a great deal of its argument just now to the defendant's sentencing submission and how the defendant's sentencing submission indicates a lack of remorse and indicates to the government certain tell tale things about the defendant's character. So let's be absolutely clear. didn't write that submission. I wrote that submission. I wrote that submission because I'm his lawyer. I wrote that submission because I have an obligation to him. I wrote that submission because, in the guidelines regime in which we operate, I have an obligation to try and mitigate the damage that occurs from the kind of piling on of points that probably became apparent to everyone in the audience and that has caused judges in this district and elsewhere to decry the outcome of the guidelines calculation in white collar cases.

And to give but one clear example, the submission that I made is attacked because the fraud is a fraud on a broad market which does not damage to any great extent individual

victims, thereby making it less likely for them to complain and
thereby making it less likely for the fraud to be detected. I
want to quote to the Court from the guidelines themselves and
the downward departure considerations at Section 2B1.1(C),
"Downward Departure Consideration." "There may be cases in
which the offense level determined under this guideline
substantially overstates the seriousness of the offense. In
such cases, a downward departure may be warranted. For
example, a securities fraud involving a fraudulent statement
made publicly to the market may produce an aggregate loss
amount that is substantial but diffuse, with relatively small
loss amounts suffered by a relatively large number of victims.
In such a case, the loss table in subsection (b)(1) and the
victims table in subsection (b)(2) may combine to produce an
offense level that substantially overstates the seriousness of
the offense. If so, a downward departure may be warranted."

That was my use of the guidelines to try and mitigate the damage that is done to my client by these guidelines, which I respectfully submit give the Court at best a color-by-numbers opportunity to create a portrait of my client. But soon enough, your Honor, you won't be sentencing the crime; you'll be sentencing the individual that sits next to me. And knowing you as I do after having spent my three trials in here, you have enough information, enough capability of nuance, enough wisdom to offer a sentence in this case which is not a

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color-by-numbers sentence of this defendant.

Is this a serious offense? Yes. All right, hell yes. But that's the beginning of the inquiry, not the end of the inquiry in this case. With all due respect to the government.

With regard to the issue of deterrence, I've spent enough time in here, and I've taken up enough time that I hope the Court will accord me an additional two minutes to tell you the story which has the virtue (a) of being true, and (b) it doesn't have a street lamp in it. OK. In 1986 I was a young pup in this practice, and I came to a firm which was named Sercarz Schechter & Lopez. And the lead partner, who put his name last deliberately, Frank Lopez, was among the most ingenious lawyers that I've ever had an opportunity to encounter. And he handled more than his fair share of the most complex organized crime and narcotics cases ever tried in the courthouse across the street. And among them was the trial in the organized crime commission case. And it was Frank Lopez's ingenious idea that the head of the Colombo crime family, who had already been sentenced and given a life sentence in the Colombo organized crime case, ought to represent himself in the commission case so that the Court would have an opportunity to hear from him without the necessity of Mr. Persico having to testify under oath. The defendants were convicted in short order, and they were sentenced before Judge Richard Owen in the building across the street. And it was clear which way the

wind was blowing after about two or three sentences. The first two heads of the families received a hundred years' sentence. And it came time for Mr. Persico and a defendant named Gennaro Langella, who Frank Lopez represented at the proceeding, to take their turn before the bench. Frank turned to the judge and he said, your Honor, my client finds himself in very much the same position as that great American patriot, Nathan Hale; he regrets that he only has one life to give to his country. The judge laughed out loud and gave him a hundred-year sentence.

I tell you this story for two reasons. The Court can take a broader view of the concept of deterrence. It's been from 1986 to 2017, your Honor. Serious crimes continue to be committed, crimes that involve death, personal injury, the distribution of narcotics on the large scale, fraud on the markets, and I'm going to urge the Court, before you impose sentence in this case, to take a moment to consider whether the experiment that is the sentencing guidelines and the imposition of these enormous guidelines based on no factor more than the concept of fraud loss are really yielding the kinds of results that are warranted in these cases.

I also tell you the story for another reason. If my memory serves me correctly, every defendant in that courtroom was eligible for parole after ten years. The people who crafted the sentencing regime in that day and age had the

wisdom not to impose upon judges the requirement that they make a futuristic prediction about when it is that a defendant will be fit to return to society. It enabled a parole department to make that decision in real time, based on a real evaluation of the defendant, with time for heads to cool and time to evaluate the defendant's sentencing adjustment. And you don't have that opportunity in this case. No judge has it, in a guideline case. Instead, your Honor, what you do have is the principle of parsimony. There are requirements that are supposed to guide the court in imposing a sentence. And in every sentence the court is tasked with imposing a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the goals of sentencing, deterrence, general and specific, and those other goals that are enumerated in the statute and with which the Court is well familiar.

I recommended a sentence in this case. And I didn't do it to pick a number to start a negotiation. I did it because I hoped to help frame the debate. You took the bench in the Fraser Thompson sentence. You said, I have a range in mind. And it provided a landscape for negotiation. I came to you with a number, 84 months, seven years, and I asked the question, what is the marginal deterrent value, what is the marginal additional deterrent value, what additional number is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the goal of deterrence, to speak to that goal specifically. And I make the

observation, your Honor, that these three trials and these proceedings did not occur in a vacuum. This was a heavily regulated industry. The dominoes began to fall in 2013 with actions by state attorney generals, with an FTC proceeding that resulted in obtaining for consumers tens of millions of dollars that had been taken from them. And that is a factor to be considered under the subject of deterrence as well. Money for victims is one of the goals of deterrence.

I would make the observation that, in considering the defendant's sentence, the Court also needs to consider the fact that he is deportable. And I commend to the Court's attention the letter by Mr. Sickler, who is an expert in the field, the content of our submission, and the fact that any sentence that is imposed is going to be more onerous on my client in several respects. He's already been remanded based on flight risk, part of which no doubt came from the fact that he is not a citizen of this country.

The defendant is going to be subject to conditions of security throughout the period of his incarceration that are more onerous than the defendants similarly situated will have to endure. The defendant will not receive good-time credit. The defendant will not have the opportunity to participate in the kind of enrichment programs that are ordinarily afforded to defendants similarly situated who find themselves in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. The defendant's security

level is going to be impacted, with all that that means -- and I commend you to Joel Sickler's letter. At the end of this term, the defendant will not have the opportunities for home confinement, supervised release, community confinement that are ordinarily afforded to defendants under his circumstances. The defendant will be held in jail for an extra length of time while the efforts are made to put him into a location from which he can properly be removed to the country of his birth.

All of this, most respectfully, is a part of the basket that goes under the title "deterrence." Anybody who looks at the sentence that this defendant is going to be made to endure has to understand all of what befell my client beginning in 2014, not only what happens to him in this courtroom.

Excuse me for one moment.

The government made an argument which, with no disrespect intended to Mr. Cooper, for whom I have enormous regard, strikes me as glib, and it's one that I want to treat for the rest of my comments. He says to you that the people that have traveled all this way — and there are people that have come from a long way to be here today — they know the Darcy Wedd that they met on the outside, but they don't know the Darcy Wedd that was illuminated by the events that were portrayed in this courtroom. And I respectfully submit that people do not develop two characters. My client has but one

character. If you're looking for the acid test of character
and I'm going to go into this in a little bit more detail
momentarily then I commend you to the presentence report at
paragraph 112, your Honor. I read the transcript of the Fraser
Thompson sentencing, and my eyebrow went up and I smiled when
the Court talked about how so often in fraud cases you can go
to the financial affidavit and find evidence of and I'm
going to use your word shenanigans, in quotes, and that may
be a very good way to see, to measure a defendant's level of
remorse and what a defendant is really about. For whatever
this is worth, your Honor, here's another test that maybe you
can employ in some case in the future to help the Court make
that same sort of determination. When you read character
letters on behalf of a defendant, you'll take them and
presumably you'll apply some sort of a discount and say, these
are people that love the defendant; maybe they're people that
have gotten something from the defendant when he was rich and
when he was riding high. So my suggestion is this. To the
extent that you're able to find it, look for the statement by
the estranged family member. Look for the statement by the
ex-wife. Look for the statement by the disgruntled employee.
And then you won't have to apply that discount before you
really get to the nub of the defendant's character.

This is the defendant's ex-wife, your Honor, Melanie Camp. And I quote: "During a recent telephone interview with

Ms. Camp, she informed that in September of 2007, they met in
Las Vegas, Nevada. She corroborated their separation and
divorce. According to Ms. Camp, their marital problems
surfaced prior to his arrest. Ms. Camp believes that the
defendant's addiction to alcohol may have contributed to their
marital problems. In terms of his arrest, Ms. Camp stated that
she was surprised and she finds it difficult to comprehend
because she knows some of his co-conspirators. Ms. Camp
reported that she respects the criminal justice system.
Reportedly she has never known the defendant to act out of
malice or greed." Let me repeat: never known him to act out of
malice or greed. "According to Ms. Camp, the industry is
complex. In general she described the defendant as someone who
is generous and supportive, both emotionally and financially to
others, including family members. Ms. Camp stated that she has
no ill will toward the defendant and wishes him well."

Your Honor, you received 57 letters, some of them as late as today. But there's one character letter you haven't read yet. That's my character reference for my client, Darcy Wedd. The following is my character reference for my client.

"This sentencing proceeding represents a daunting task for me. The sentencing guidelines call upon this Court to impose upon him a sentence that would result in his imprisonment for the rest of his natural life. Your Honor, I cannot compete with your wisdom or your experience in handling

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sentences under the guidelines regime. Moreover, the firm of Paul, Cooper & Beidel is far more adept than I at harnessing the case law commentaries and the guidelines themselves in support of what they deem to be an appropriate result in this case."

And as I speak to you now, my heart is in my throat. Your comments thus far and at prior sentences leave me with the concern that, in your view, my client is a smooth-talking defendant with no regard for the results his behavior had on the welfare of those whose lives he touched. If that's the way you feel, most respectfully, you have him pegged wrong. see, I know the character of this man better than the rest of those involved in these proceedings. I've represent him for the better part of three years. I've met with him together with other lawyers and their clients in Los Angeles, and I've met with him alone in my office in New York. I've been his advocate and seen him through the crucible of three trials. I've waited with him while three juries deliberated on his future. And I was the one who sat with him, your Honor, in a jail cell and told him that his beloved father had passed away and would never be there to see him again. In short, while I've always been with him while he has operated under the stress of a criminal indictment and an uncertain future, I have been with him when life seemed, relatively speaking, to be good, and I've been with him when it was not so good. And

here's what I've learned. First of all, if a person's character is defined by how he or she behaves when no one is paying attention, you only need to read the letter of one person, his cell mate, Mr. Van Manen, to learn all that you need to know about Darcy's character.

Mr. Van Manen, for those in the audience, was an inmate who was plopped into Darcy's jail cell very shortly after he arrived there and suffering through the ravages of withdrawal from a serious heroin addiction.

"When Mr. Van Manen was placed in that cell with Darcy, he didn't know anything about Darcy's background. He didn't know about the charges against this defendant. He didn't know that Darcy, newly deposited on 9 South himself, was terrified. All he knew was that he was dealing with the ravages of heroin withdrawal and Darcy was there to help.

"Your Honor, I submit to you that the reason why some white collar defendants eventually return to criminal activity is that they cannot function without the power and the wealth and the status conferred by their fraudulent conduct. But on 9 South Darcy had no power. Darcy had no wealth. Darcy came armed only with his good character. He wore his prison jumpsuit, not a fancy set of clothes. He didn't drive a Bentley on 9 South. The only armature he had is his good character, the one good character that he possesses. And he did what he's always done. He offered his care and attention.

He helped.

"This Court need have no worry about how Mr. Wedd will perform in the world when he leaves his jail cell for the final time.

"Second, in its sentencing submission, the government describes Mr. Wedd as having been remorseless, in perpetrating the fraud of which he has been convicted. The glib response would be to say that no one feels remorse while they're engaged in criminal conduct. I have further responded by indicating that, to the extent that the sentencing submission is perceived by the government as limiting a lack of remorse, that was my submission.

"But I know a little bit more about the meaning of remorse, and I know a little bit more about the nature of my client's character. I've encountered my share of defendants who, when confronted with overwhelming evidence of their guilt, quickly determine that it was in their own selfish best interest to immediately enter a guiltily plea and/or participate with the government in the process of apportioning blame. The authors of the federal sentencing guidelines have seen fit in their wisdom to reward this behavior with three points off for acceptance of responsibility. The government in its wisdom has seen fit to reward its witnesses with the expectation of a sentence reduction pursuant to the standard cooperation agreement employed here in the Southern District.

I'm all too familiar with transactional remorse, with institutional remorse. When Darcy testified at the first trial and Mr. Cooper questioned him, as he did, as he had every right to do, as he should have done, about the many ways in which he could have stopped Lin Miao from further engaging in auto-subscribing when he learned about it at that meeting in San Diego, in response to one of Mr. Cooper's questions, Darcy added to his answer: 'I know I could have done more and I'll regret it for the rest of my life.' Mr. Cooper said that was a nonresponsive answer, and in the context of the trial, he was right. It may not have been relevant then, but it's relevant now, your Honor. My client, Darcy Wedd, is full of remorse. His remorse is real. He's remorseful for the harm done to the countless innocent victims whose monthly phone bills were padded.

But that's not the true measure of his remorse. His remorse is something he can't run away from. It comes to him at night before he gets up in the morning. It comes to him before he engages in the chores of an orderly. It comes to him before he goes up to the 11th floor to exercise on the roof and after he's on the way back down. It's a searing pain that comes to him whenever he thinks about what he did to put himself here. And I know he experiences this pain because I know about this man. I understand about this man. And the pain comes from the fact that he knows in his soul that he

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could have done more to be part of the solution for premium short messaging service, and he could have done less to be part of the problem."

And, your Honor, that searing pain is the best insurance that you have that Mr. Wedd will never again grace the doors of a courtroom as a criminal defendant once he secures his release.

"Third" -- and I don't have much more to go. filibuster is almost over. "At all three trials, I described Darcy has someone who has an appetite for adventure and a thirst for risk. Of course when I said this I was referring to his decision to come to New York, where he had no family or friends, to rent an apartment on John Street, with a bedroom and a living room big enough to hold a desk, and to establish Mobile Messenger here in the United States. This Court, which possesses a remarkable skill at remembering statements by counsel and remaining counsel of their words, at what may be the most unfortunate of times, reminded me of my words when it was considering whether or not Mr. Wedd was a flight risk at the time of his remand. Your Honor, I stand by this situation of my client. And fully mindful that you will have the last word in this case, I would suggest this: Personal growth is nothing less than a lifelong adventure. And change, real change, requires courage, flexibility, and a willingness to embrace risk. Darcy has those characteristics in abundance.

And they will serve him well in the sentence that he must engage, your Honor.

"In conclusion, what I would say is this. All I've learned about this man tells me that whatever sentence you see fit to impose, he'll bear up under it with good grace. He simply knows no other way.

"As always, your Honor, I thank you for this opportunity. Maurice Sercarz, the guy who helped tie up your courtroom for the better part of 2017."

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sercarz.

Mr. Wedd, would you like to address the Court before sentence is imposed?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, just briefly, your Honor. A lot of what I wanted to say was just recounted by Maurice. What I would like to say to you is that I'd like a second chance. I know that I have a lot to offer. I've got plans for how I'm going to approach my sentence in a positive way, not just for myself but also for the people that — whose paths that I crossed. But I just want to do something after my — after I'm released that better matches my personality.

And that is all I have to say. I'm sorry it wasn't very eloquent. But I just appeal for a second chance, and I know I do a lot to offer. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wedd.

Imposing sentence is the hardest things that a judge

does, because it's one human being sitting here looking another person, another human being in the face, in the eyes, Mr. Wedd, and telling you how long you're going to spend behind bars.

And when I do that, it is the most humbling thing I can do, and a kind of power that I don't think any single person should have. If sentencing could be done differently, I would have three judges do it, and we would come up with a way in which the three judges would, together, arrive at a sentence that would reflect a spectrum.

But that's not the way our society has seen fit to sentence defendants. And so I try very, very hard to ensure that I have considered what I think other judges would find reasonable. I know that there are judges who find sentences I impose unreasonable. And I know there are judges who find the sentences are reasonable. And what I try to do is, for every single sentence, come up with one that's reasonable, that is sufficient but not greater than necessary.

Defendants like you present a very difficult situation, because I have sat with you through three trials and I have seen you through three trials, and I understand that you're not a bad guy. And I find, with, frankly, with a lot of fraud defendants, frankly, Mr. Thompson, since Mr. Sercarz has read that transcript -- I said similar remarks then -- they can often be very charming. They're usually highly intelligent, more educated than not, and they're people who, like criminals

of -- who've done other kinds of crimes, are multifaceted.

They're not all bad. They're not all good. They're not

defined by all the goodness that's in their character letters

or all the badness that's found within their crimes. There's a

complexity to the human spirit. There's a complexity to human

nature. And that's what I find.

With you, it is important that you understand the sentence that I impose, because, while there are a lot of people here, as I also say at sentences frequently, you are the only one who is actually going to go to the cell after this and have to start serving that time. Indeed, you've already begun to serve that time.

So I'll explain it to you as best I can and hope that when you think about on this proceeding, you will understand that even if you don't agree with it, you at least heard the words that I put around it as the reason for the sentence and understood that I thought about it, very long and very hard.

I have to start with the guidelines, but I also have to ask whether they're reasonable. I've told you folks already in this proceeding that the guidelines suggest life, and I am not — that life is not on the table, that I am not considering a life sentence. This is not that kind of crime. Your conduct was not that kind of conduct.

I nevertheless then go to where, then, in the range below life do we fall. It's a big range. You're 41 years old.

40. Soon to be 41. Right? Sometime this year. 40 years old.
And, God willing, there's a lot of life ahead of you. And so I
have to turn to these factors, the 3553(a) factors in the
federal sentencing statute. And they ask the Court to come up
with what is a sufficient but not greater than necessary
sentence, that reflects a variety of purposes of sentencing.
They are captured in different words. They are captured in
things like general deterrence and personal deterrence and
seriousness of the offense. And they're captured in things
like whether or not there are educational, medical,
correctional, or vocational treatment that is needed, whether
or not a particular sentence promotes respect for the law,
whether or not a particular sentence is a just sentence. And
ultimately what they're doing is, they're trying to capture
sort of the philosophy of sentencing behind that, whether it's
retribution for the victims, for our society, where the social
contract has been violated, whether it's some concept of
rehabilitation, or incapacitation, and other concepts that were
put in there.

So I start off with the seriousness of the offense.

People often find that to be the least attractive part of any sentencing proceeding because it goes back that's not about just who the defendant is in terms of the mitigating factors, but also it's really about why we're here at all, which is, what is the crime. We've already, I think, had some discussion

of that already. It was a massive fraud that touched at least many thousands of people, and it touched them in a way that was particularly pernicious, because, while it didn't take a large sum from any one of them, it caused a large number of them to have discomfort, pain, hardship at varying levels, depending upon their personal circumstances, while their money, whether it was perhaps just an annoyance to them that they lost 9.99, or perhaps a hardship to them, where they could not pay their bill because they lived paycheck to paycheck and couldn't get a phone company to refund it quickly enough and had a bill that they then couldn't meet. Across that spectrum, the human experience lies for the victims. And there were thousands of them.

And these were people, some of whom for sure, were individuals who earned minimum wage. So for the \$10 that went into not even a cocktail that it was used for when it was given to somebody as a result of the fraud and then used to pay some bill that happened to be associated with cocktails on the beach, that \$10 represented them standing at the counter for an hour, maybe a little more. It represented them doing whatever it was that they had to do just to be able to have that money taken and used for whatever pleasurable expense, to buy part of a Bentley, to buy property, I don't know.

But the reason that I am here to impose sentence is because we have deemed as a society that the victims need a

voice, that society has to say, you cannot do this without stopping and understanding the cost, the cost both to violating our social compact and then the cost to the real human beings who you affect.

So I think about the nature of your crime. I think about the victims. I think it was a crime that had so many deliberate moments in it, so much intentional conduct. I reject entirely the idea that you didn't know exactly what was happening and agreed to engage in it, for whatever reason, sufficient unto yourself. I do hope you would never do it again. I do hope that that is behind you, that life will take you in different places.

There is unfortunately a high degree of recidivism for fraud. That's not true for everyone. And hope springs eternal, has to; otherwise we get very discouraged doing what we do.

So I start off and I think a lot about the seriousness of the offense and I turn to who you are. And I think you've been different people at different times in your life. You've always been a hard worker. Even when you were at Mobile Messenger committing fraud you were a hard worker. It's not like you weren't showing up to work and putting in a lot of hours and trying, at the same time that you were committing fraud, to take the business in a different direction. That's just part of the complexity of who you were. You worked when

you were young. You worked hard as a young boy, so far as I can tell from the letters and from your own letter and from your mother's letter, from how it's progressed throughout. But you were somewhere who, somewhere in there, was able to essentially take from others, maybe without really realizing that the people that you encountered every single day you might have been — the valet at the hotel that you would stay at where you would have your car parked, it may have been that valet you were you auto-subscribing. So when you were giving them that tip, that tip was coming back at you. Unclear.

There's a callousness in the behavior that needs to be recognized. And I do recognize it. On the other hand, I do also want to give you credit for and recognize the part of your person that's hardworking, that has established longterm, important friendships, family relationships. I think it was the aunt of your girlfriend who put in the photograph. And I looked at that photograph quite a lot, because it made you human, in a group, a large group of people, at a point in time when you were under indictment, going through these trials. And it's a statement about people's belief in you that's very powerful, because it's a large family who embrace you and embraced you.

So I look at that too and I think, this is not some social -- you know, there's no pathology here that's evidenced in any way that is pronounced in terms of some ability or

inability to create loving, supportive relationships. Those are the best indicia of where you'll be later in life.

So I then think about, OK, what are the purposes of sentencing. So now I know this individual has got parts of his humanness that are parts that will be able to give back to families to people to society down the road. I also believe that it's somebody who needs to be punished for what he did. Where on the spectrum of between today and life do we stop? It's a big range.

So what I think about is, what are the purposes of sentencing? How much do you need for personal deterrence? How much do you need for general deterrence? How much do you need for general deterrence? How much of that should weigh on you in your life versus spread out over a number of sentences over time?

And I want to ensure that there aren't undue sentencing disparities between you and other defendants or you and other people who have committed fraud crimes in this district. And I think about all these things.

So where do I come out? I come out higher than your lawyer and lower than I was before I walked in here. I come out in a place where it is my view that a total sentence of ten years, all together, is appropriate, is sufficient but not greater than necessary. It will serve the purpose of general deterrence because the ten-year sentence will be known as a

ten-year sentence. It will be referenced as a ten-year sentence. And that's a long time. That's a big sentence. 48 months of that are split between Counts Three and Seven. Count Three is 24 months. Count Seven is 24 months. They are consecutive to the remaining 72.

Did I get that right? Let me do my math. I just had it written down. Is that correct?

MR. SERCARZ: You're correct. 120 months in total.

THE COURT: 120 months all together.

Now, I also take into account Mr. Sickler's piece.

I've already taken that into account. I was actually, when I walked out here, I will tell you that I was at 14 years. And as I think about it, it is my view that the ten-year sentence will serve one of the primary purposes of general deterrence, because it will be referenced as a ten-year sentence. And so I think that that is sufficient and not greater than necessary.

It is very important that I also take into consideration the fact that you will be in deportation proceedings after this and that I recognize that you will be in a facility where you will not get time off for good behavior, that you will not have the same kind of programs and opportunities that other defendants will have, and that all of those things serve to increase the way in which your time is experienced as hardship. And so therefore I think that the ten years is an appropriate sentence here.

There will be also three years of supervised release. And I should say, of the 72 months, the 72 months are for all of the other counts, not Three and Seven, but all other counts, for each one of them, imposed separately and to run concurrently. So that what we have is, Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, Eight will be 72 months. Counts Three and Seven will be 24 months each, for a total of 120 months.

A three-year period of supervised release for all counts, not Counts Three and Seven, all other counts. One, you shall cooperate in the collection of DNA. Two, you shall not possess a firearm or other destructive device. Three, you shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime. Four, you shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. Five, you shall refrain from the unlawful use of a controlled substance and may be drug tested. And, six, you must pay any forfeiture obligation in restitution.

You have to provide the Probation Office with any requested financial information, is a special condition, as well as submitting your person, vehicle, place of residence to reasonable searches as reasonably requested by probation. You shall not open any new credit card charges or credit lines without approval of probation. You shall notify the U.S. Attorney's Office within 30 days of changing your residence. You shall obey all immigration laws and directives of the immigration authorities.

You shall report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of your release from custody. And you shall be supervised in your district of residence.

There's a special assessment of \$800. That's \$100 for each of the counts. And I have to impose that and I do impose that.

I'm not going to separately set a fine, because you will have a very significant forfeiture and restitution obligation, in the millions of dollars. And I ask the government, if it's still changing, to -- actually, the restitution will be different -- to give the Court a final order of restitution and forfeiture within 90 days. The forfeiture is for properties and be proceeds traceable to the offense. Restitution is for identifiable victims. It's also forfeiture of the amount that he had received. As you folks know, the law relating to forfeiture is different today than it was in the early part of 2017. And so the forfeiture amount does take into consideration recent Second Circuit case law in that regard and Supreme Court case law in that regard.

So I'm not going to state the amount unless you've got an amount right now that can be stated. Otherwise it's -- I'd ask that you confer with counsel on the amount. I believe you'll be able to reach an amount where appeal rights are maintained.

Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, we're still discussing with Mr. Sercarz, we believe that the correct forfeiture amount is \$1,742,583. I believe there may be a dispute between the parties as to whether that's appropriate or whether a lower number is appropriate. We can put in a letter to the Court, in the event that we're unable to reach an agreement in the next few days, put in a letter outlining our position.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sercarz, would it be acceptable to you if the Court left this proceeding open while we do that?

MR. SERCARZ: It is. And so you understand the nature of the dispute, I argued at three trials that the defendant did not receive additional money from Tatto. I remind the Court that all the money that Mr. Wedd received came from Concise Consulting, a business that was controlled by Paj, and I argued using Government's Exhibit 1401 that he received the same amount of money in total as Fraser Thompson, which is logically inconsistent with the notion that my client was being paid on two conspiracies rather than one.

I think we are going to agree on a great number of properties which are going to be signed over to the government in order to meet my client's forfeiture obligation. I would hope that the Court treats the issue of restitution in the same way that it did with regard to Fraser Thompson, but I have a feeling that the Court may be asked -- I have to talk further

with my client -- just to make a finding as to whether or not the government's number concerning the forfeiture is correct.

THE COURT: All right. So why don't we do this. Why don't we keep the proceeding open for one week, only for the purpose of solidifying the number relating to forfeiture and for restitution. If, after you folks have put in a letter or dueling letters on that, if we need to have another session where we go only over those amounts, we can do so. If people are prepared to have the Court rule and not require this proceeding to be held with all of us in attendance, then please let me know that and I'll be guided by you. But certainly we can be present in court if people believe that it's important to do some.

So those amounts will be determined on consent after this session today.

Is there any legal or other reasons why sentence should not be imposed as stated?

MR. COOPER: No, your Honor.

MR. SERCARZ: No. I have one request with regard to designation, now or later.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just make sure I don't forget these pieces.

I do impose sentence as stated.

There aren't any open counts. He was tried on the indictment. Or are there, underlying? There is no underlying

indictment, OK. So that's dismissed.

Now, Mr. Wedd, you have a right to appeal. Any notice of appeal needs to be filed within 14 days of the filing of the judgment of conviction. If you cannot afford the cost of appeal you can apply to have those costs waived. It's called proceeding in forma pauperis, and you have a right to apply to proceed in that manner.

All right. Now, Mr. Sercarz, I'm ready for your request.

MR. SERCARZ: Thank you. It's a bit complicated, so forgive me, your Honor. In my conversations with Mr. Sickler, he indicates to me that it's all but a formality and the defendant is going to end up being designated to a contract facility rather than one operated by the Bureau of Prisons. But to the extent that there is flexibility and to the extent that the Court wishes to see the defendant in an environment where he has the same opportunities as other inmates, our request would be that the defendant be designated, at least in the first instance, to LFCI Allenwood in White Deer, Pennsylvania, and be afforded the opportunity to participate in the prison's institutional hearing program, to address removal proceedings, and that the defendant not be designated to one of the BOP's privately contracted facilities for sentenced aliens.

"The Court" -- and this is language we would ask the Court to include -- "The Court does not want this defendant

designated to Moshannon Valley CI." I can hand this up to the Court. You can rule on it in any way you wish, your Honor. That would be our request. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask the government, do they have any position one way or the other? MR. COOPER: No position. THE COURT: I will not order that, but I will make a recommendation that will track that language. MR. SERCARZ: All right. THE COURT: All right. The Court will make that recommendation. Is there anything further that we should do today? MR. SERCARZ: No. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We are adjourned.